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Original Article
The geophysical reality of global climate change creates a 
global risk society fraught with intensifying disasters (Beck 
1999). Given the magnitude and universality of the risk, it 
would be in all societies’ best long-term interests to cooper-
ate in the solution, contributing whatever they can to help 
one another reduce emissions and protect forest carbon sinks. 
In environmental sociology, this is an attitude known as cos-
mopolitanism, a concern for global society as opposed to 
narrow national interests (Beck 2010b; Tyfield and Urry 
2009). Climate risk challenges humanity to achieve unprec-
edented heights of global consensus and cooperation, of cos-
mopolitanism, requiring the emergence of a new, more 
integrated global society and culture. This kind of cultural 
integration can be defined as “a shared set of cultural under-
standings that provide the basis for communication and 
social action” (Hironaka 2014:112). As such, global climate 
change represents a world-historical opportunity for the 
emergence of a common global society, with failure to do so 
likely to bring intensifying calamity for all parties. Climate 
catastrophe itself may have an emancipatory effect upon this 
process, enhancing global cosmopolitan cooperation (Beck 
2010a). On the other hand, intensifying climate disasters 
might have the opposite effect, overwhelming national cop-
ing capacities and causing the emergence of a short-term 
“lifeboat ethic” of allowing the weak to drown.
Many obstacles suppress this nascent cosmopolitanism. 
Most prominently, the realities of global inequalities in both 
wealth and in immediate vulnerability to climate change 
disaster tear apart the fragile consensus on the need for 
global action. These inequalities are in part the legacy of 
colonialism and neoliberal economic depredation (Roberts 
and Parks 2007; Shue 2014). The obstacles are also due to 
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the vast scale and diffuse quality of the risk. A third factor is 
the difference between domestic and foreign politics. 
Concern about the social effects of climate change disasters 
tends to stop at national borders, because the political influ-
ence of the victims, if any, also stops there (Beck 2010b). In 
a global blame game, postcolonial poor nations tend to 
blame the rich nations for the problem and say they must act 
first (Billett 2009). But the rich nations tend to say, “if the 
large poor nations don’t act, our reductions will be meaning-
less.” The rich nations, especially the United States, also 
worry that emissions reductions will further damage the 
economy, when so many jobs have already moved to China 
and India (Roberts 2011). In general, nations tend to pay 
attention to more immediate problems and interests. They 
remain largely preoccupied with other concerns, unable to 
summon the needed political will to reduce emissions. Their 
diverse orientations have balkanized the global field of cli-
mate change discourse and enervated global negotiations. 
This situation of global noncooperation represents the larg-
est dilemma of collective action in world history. The long-
term pubic good is obviated by actors following short-term, 
selfish interests (Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003).
In this light, the United Nations (UN) climate change 
negotiations should be considered a “workspace” wherein 
better agreements must be crafted (Hironaka 2014:20, 62). 
The 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) established a series of conferences of the parties 
(COPs) to the convention. To enhance continuing negotia-
tions, the 2015 COP 21 agreement called for “transparency 
of action and support” (United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change 2015a). In other words, the 
parties to the convention need to know more about the details 
and nuances of each other’s stances on climate change.
One way of enhancing the requested transparency would be 
to make the particular stances toward climate change of the 
diverse societies and governments more clearly apparent to all 
actors on the world stage. The present project takes a practical 
step in that direction by clarifying differences in framing—
giving meaning to—while also analyzing the underlying fac-
tors that drive the diverse patterns of world opinion. World 
society theory sees a growing climate cosmopolitanism, while 
climate justice theory sees a continuation of global economic 
inequalities fueling continued dissension. Our investigation of 
the major factors dividing how societies frame climate change 
provides insight into the exact parameters of these debates.
Newspaper framing—issue interpretation—is an impor-
tant window into understanding these national stances 
(Boykoff 2011). As Beck (2010a) wrote, “The political explo-
siveness of global risks is largely a function of their (re-)pre-
sentation in the mass media. When staged in the media, global 
risks can become ‘cosmopolitan events’” (p. 260). Of course, 
newspaper articles are not synonymous with policy in the 
political sphere. The research on comparative newspaper 
framing of climate change reported in this article covers the 
two years (2007–2008) just before the watershed 2009 COP 
meeting (Roberts 2011). This period remains a key historical 
moment to study in terms of understanding contemporary cli-
mate politics. It is a peak period for coverage in many coun-
tries, largely driven by the convergence of An Inconvenient 
Truth and the Nobel prize for the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) and Al Gore. The 2009 COP 15 in 
Paris was intended to frame a new world agreement that 
would for the first time include the developing (or Annex II) 
counties. Accordingly, it was a particularly heightened 
moment of public and media interest in the issue.
Different social and cultural tendencies may exacerbate 
or reinforce global divides and help cement differences in pol-
icy debate. The 17 societies in this study represent both large 
and small greenhouse gas emitters that differ in their ways of 
framing climate change and in their responses. The societies, 
in rough geographic clustering, are the United States, Canada, 
Mexico, Brazil, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China, New 
1University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN, USA; 2University of Mississippi, Oxford, MS, USA; 3University of the Aegean, Lesbos, Greece; 4Stockholm 
Environmental Institute, Stockholm, Sweden; 5University of Minho, Minho, Portugal; 6National Taiwan University, Taiwan; 7Lund University, Lund, Sweden; 
8University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA; 9The King’s University, Edmonton, AB, Canada; 10Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan; 11University of 
Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland; 12University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal; 13Japan Women’s University, Tokyo, Japan; 14Tsinghua University, Beijing, China; 
15Environment and Society Research Institute, Seoul, Korea; 16Earth System Science Center, Brazilian Institute for Space Research, São José dos Campos, 
Brazil; 17National Central University, Taiwan; 18University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany; 19University College, Dublin, Ireland; 20National Law 
School, Bangalore, India; 21University of Southampton, United Kingdom; 22University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA, USA; 23Centro 
de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (Center for Research and Teaching in Economics), Mexico City, Mexico; 24University of Exeter, Exeter, UK; 
25Memorial University, St. John’s, NL, Canada; 26ABV - Indian Institute of Information Technology and Management, Gwalior, India; 27Hitotsubashi 
University, Tokyo, Japan; 28University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada; 29United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan; 30Picker Institute, Oxford, 
UK; 31Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea; 32Shenzhen, China
Authorship Note: Authors after Jeffrey Broadbent and John Sonnett are listed in alphabetical order. Authors’ country teams were as follows: Brazil 
team: Myanna Lahsen; Canada team: David Tindall, Mark C. J. Stoddart, Randolph Haluza-DeLay; China team: Jun Jin, Yu-Ju Chien, Sun Zhengyi; 
Germany team: Jana Ollmann, Thomas Malang; Greece team: Iosef Botetzagias, Georgios Giouzepas; India team: Pradip Swarnakar, Sony Pellissery; 
Ireland team: Diane Payne, Paul Wagner; Japan team: Koichi Hasegawa, Keiichi Satoh, Kazuhiro Ikeda, Tomoyuki Tatsumi; Korea team: Dowan 
Ku, Sun-Jin Yun; Mexico team: Simone Pulver, Jaime Sainz; New Zealand team: Philip Vaughter; Portugal team: Luisa Schmidt, Ana Horta, Anabela 
Carvalho; Sweden team: Christopher Edling, Marcus Carson; Switzerland team: Christian Hirschi; Taiwan team: Tze-Luen Alan Lin, Ho-Ching Lee; 
United Kingdom team: Clare Saunders, Stephan Price; United States team: Philip Vaughter, Jeffrey Broadbent, Dana Fisher.
Corresponding Author:
Jeffrey Broadbent, University of Minnesota, Department of Sociology, 909 Social Science Building, 267 19th Avenue S., Minneapolis, MN 55455, USA. 
Email: broad001@umn.edu
Broadbent et al. 3
Zealand, India, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Germany, Greece, Switzerland, and Portugal. Lacking Africa, 
the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the transitioning coun-
tries, of course, the article and research project cannot claim to 
represent the full breadth of global framing. But it still incudes 
most of the large-emitter countries as well as others that pres-
ent interesting and important variations in response.
We draw on field theory to examine relations between these 
cases on the basis of the framing of climate change in their 
national newspapers. Field theory emphasizes the interactions 
between cases within arenas of “self-organized contestation” 
(Martin 2003). We assume that the framing of climate change 
in one case is not wholly independent of its framing in other 
cases. Our results show that four major contentious issues 
divide climate change discourse: (1) acceptance versus rejec-
tion of consensus climate change science, (2) scale of ecologi-
cal concern from global to domestic, (3) scale of political 
concern from global to domestic, and (4) degree of support for 
government emissions reductions policies. These findings 
reveal a very complex distribution of interpretations of climate 
change, as revealed by newspaper frames.
Consideration of these cases’ media framings in light of 
their emissions performance yields insight into how cultural 
politics play out in news media and how such mediation can 
affect performance on mitigation. Going beyond describing 
the distribution of frames, we test, and find modest support 
for, the hypothesis that compared with the 1990 baseline, 
countries are more likely to reduce emissions when their 
newspaper frames accept IPCC-type science, orient to the 
global level of climate politics and ecological risks, and sup-
port mitigation policies. We label these positive frames. Of 
course, we do not claim that all the formative factors are 
revealed in newspaper framing. The politics of climate change 
is a very complex multilevel and “wicked” problem involving 
a range of factors (Lazarus 2008; Levin et al. 2012). However, 
we do claim that the results of the present analysis offer some 
valid and useful insights into this complex process.
Literature Review
A Turning Point in the Global Climate Change 
Regime
The global climate regime has gradually developed over past 
decades. It began with the 1988 IPCC and the 1992 UNFCCC. 
These international institutions respectively promulgated 
scientific knowledge about and supportive norms for miti-
gating climate change (Hironaka 2014). Subsequent COPs to 
the UNFCCC sought to implement its normative injunctions. 
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol (COP 3) assigned emissions reduc-
tions targets to many industrialized countries (attainment 
period 2008–2012). The protocol achieved some positive 
effect (Iwata and Okada 2014). But it was hampered by dif-
fering levels of performance, dropout of key countries, and 
lack of inclusion of developing countries.
The 2009 Copenhagen COP 15 first tried to include devel-
oping countries under a common regime. This meeting 
proved to be a major change point in the global negotiation 
system. Scientists and negotiators realized that the previous 
Kyoto Protocol, which included only the industrialized coun-
tries, was not sufficient to reduce global emissions. China 
had grown rapidly and become the world’s largest emitter of 
carbon dioxide. India and other Asian countries were grow-
ing rapidly as well. However, up to this point, recognizing 
their developing status, the international climate regime had 
not put these developing countries under any formal obliga-
tion to reduce their emissions. COP 15 was intended to rec-
tify this problem and begin the creation of a new form of 
Kyoto Protocol that would place formal emissions reduc-
tions targets on the developing countries as well.
At the 2009 meeting, divisions between developed and 
developing countries came to a head, each side pointing the 
finger of blame for climate change at the other. The meeting 
broke down in acrimony, producing only a weak agreement 
among the leaders of the BASIC countries (Brazil, South 
Africa, India and China) and the United States to take posi-
tive action (Diringer 2011). Accordingly, the 2009 COP was 
a watershed moment when the Kyoto Protocol systems of 
central assignment of emissions reduction targets broke 
down and proved unworkable as a truly globally encompass-
ing system (Bodansky 2011; Ciplet, Roberts and Khan 2015).
Faced with these deep fissures, the 2015 COP 21 turned 
away from centrally determined target allocations. It concluded 
an agreement among 194 countries to implement voluntary, 
self-determined amounts and forms of emission reduction, 
called intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs). 
The COP process leadership hoped that this voluntary approach 
would work better than centrally assigned emissions reductions 
targets. At present, though, even the INDC pledges (187 sub-
mitted as of December 2015) are hardly sufficient. Even if fully 
implemented, they will still result in a planetary warming of 
3.5°C to 4.5°C, a level unacceptable by all scientific predic-
tions of likely levels of disaster.
It is therefore important to understand the factors behind 
the disagreements made apparent by the 2009 COP 15 meet-
ings. The 2007–2008 period was very formative, a time when 
many countries were deciding their basic stances vis-à-vis an 
emerging global regime. This is, in other words, an excellent 
period for studying the basic differences in how countries 
frame climate change. Of course, national framing is a mov-
ing target and all countries’ stances have continued to evolve 
through time. But the strength of the divisions among coun-
tries that became apparent during this period led to funda-
mental changes in the envisioned possibilities of global 
climate change agreements.
Framing Global Climate Change
For a society to become earnestly engaged in the needed 
global effort, some social orientations or frames are more 
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conducive than others. Frames give meaning to and indicate 
how to interpret events and objects within discourse (Boykoff 
2011). They can range from adjectives describing the object 
itself to the context of discussion about the object. For 
instance, climate change itself can be framed as “real” or 
“illusionary,” or climate change can be discussed in a host of 
different contexts: economic effects, alternative energy tech-
nology, the political process, policy specifics, allocation of 
responsibility and so forth. Although the norm of newspaper 
reporting is detached objectivity (except in opinion col-
umns), in fact editors and reporters cannot but frame an 
object, whether purposely or not. This conveys a meaning 
about the object to the readers. In this way, frames can influ-
ence beliefs, preferences, and risk perceptions, and through 
these, actions (Benford and Snow 2000; Nisbet 2009; Snow 
and Benford 1992:137). For instance, some frames “con-
struct” climate change as a problem that must be addressed 
and solved, while others obscure and reject that need and 
urgency (Carvalho 2007; Eder 1996; Hannigan 1995). 
Hironaka (2014:136) contended that “the growth of the cul-
tural meaningfulness and salience of climate change” has 
strengthened the global climate change regime. The four 
lines of framing divisions noted above each represent impor-
tant “meanings” that can affect the domestic policy forma-
tion process around climate change, as explained below.
As a social problem, climate change is, first of all, extreme 
in its reliance on scientific findings and theory. The capacity 
to frame climate change as a problem depends on the degree 
of belief in the majority science (e.g., as promulgated by the 
IPCC reports). The vast majority of experts on the topic have 
concluded that the recent, rapid climate change is manmade 
(Oreskes 2004). Yet in some societies, antiscientific cultures 
(Jasanoff 2005) as well as governments and companies that 
deal in fossil fuels (Klein 2014) have conducted rejection 
campaigns, causing stalemate at this first step (Tranter and 
Booth 2015). If a society tends to reject the scientific find-
ings about climate change, it will undercut the very rationale 
for doing anything about climate change. Therefore, one 
essential orientation for a society to take action to reduce its 
emissions is to accept the main scientific findings that show 
that (recent, rapid) climate change is caused by human activ-
ity. Of course, a society could reduce its carbon dioxide 
emissions for reasons other than concern about climate 
change, for instance, because of economic recession or to 
reduce reliance on foreign oil imports. In assessing the emis-
sions trajectories of national cases, such factors must also be 
considered. But for countries to generate sufficient political 
will to radically reduce emissions in the amount needed to 
avert ever worsening climate threats, they will have to base 
their individual and collective global actions on a solid 
acceptance of IPCC science.
Once accepted, this scientific frame implies the risk 
frame—that if left unchecked, climate change will bring 
disaster to human and other life forms on the planet. Beck’s 
(1992, 2010a) risk society thesis argues that we have entered 
a new stage of social evolution in which human-invented 
technologies have come to pose the gravest risks to our well-
being and existence. The radioactive cloud that wafted over 
Germany from the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear meltdown ini-
tially inspired his work. But climate change poses an even 
graver technological risk to humanity—from the burning of 
fossil fuels. The complications of the global weather system 
make exact prediction impossible, but general trends toward 
worsening impact are well supported (Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change 2014). Yet the degrees of uncer-
tainty have given room for skeptics to deny the predicted 
risks from climate change; some even contend that increased 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere will have an overall and 
long-term beneficial effect upon agricultural productivity 
(McCright and Dunlap 2000). One could speak of the differ-
ent risk cultures present across societies that would also 
affect the intensity of discounting the future and what risks it 
might hold (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982).
Recognition of risk implies a moral duty to respond. An 
important frame in the set is acceptance of a moral or norma-
tive duty to reduce or end carbon emissions domestically and 
globally. An orientation to the global UN politics and agree-
ments, which urge rapid action to reduce emissions, should 
make a country more open to enacting government policies 
to mitigate climate change. Hironaka (2014) argued that 
“adoption occurs first among those most central to the global 
‘conversation’ and spreads outwards to those less engaged in 
global institutions and discourses.” She further stated that 
“Western nation-states tend to be centrally involved in global 
discourses” (p. 122). This morality could be extended to the 
environment itself. Countries that show greater concern for 
the effects of climate change on the global environment, as 
opposed to at most a narrow concern for the domestic envi-
ronment, should have stronger political will to carry out miti-
gation measures. This is so because a collective morality is 
required to overcome the divisive effects of the dilemmas of 
collective action and public goods (Dietz et al. 2003).
A final frame concerns the means to attain the ends. It 
involves the acceptance of practical countermeasures, a 
frame potentially independent of the preceding ones. 
Mitigation measures can be implemented through govern-
ment policies or arise voluntarily from social actors. A host 
of measures are possible, ranging from carbon tax and emis-
sions trading schemes through subsidies for research and 
consumer change to grassroots initiatives to reduce, reuse, 
and recycle. One of the principle factors is the degree of sup-
port offered by the dominant political culture concerning 
government intervention in the economy. Many analysts 
think that government policies such as carbon tax are required 
to effectively reduce emissions (Giddens 2009). Although 
successful in Sweden and other European economies 
(Giddens 2009), laissez-faire economies, especially the 
United States, have vehemently opposed such state action 
(Perrow and Pulver 2015). A host of policy and voluntary 
measures for emissions reductions and support for 
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alternative energy are available as mitigation measures. In 
this article, we combine them into a single measure of orien-
tation toward government mitigation policies. This frame 
also concerns our technological capacity to replace fossil 
fuels with noncarbon sources of energy. Great debates have 
erupted over possible economic disruption from this energy 
transition, but many experts agree that a combination of con-
servation and green energy could eventually power most of 
human needs around the world (Pacala and Socolow 2004) 
without great economic disruption (Stern 2007).
Explaining Global Frame Patterns
Realist international relations (IR) and world society theories 
predict different global distributions of frames about climate 
change. The assumptions of traditional realist theory in IR 
run contrary to institutionalist, as well as newer social con-
structionist and world society theories. Realist IR theory 
gives prominence to national economic and political inter-
ests that see the rest of the world in instrumental terms. This 
would predict that, facing climate change, nations would 
frame their response in terms of their immediate self-interest 
(Bodansky 2009; Ciplet et al. 2015). Worry about the nega-
tive consequences of emissions reductions on the economy 
and on national security would dominate the press. Realist 
IR theory does not recognize the importance of the global 
environment as a factor in shaping the national interest 
(Vogeler and Imber 2005:6).
More recently, though, national agencies have come to rec-
ognize that the weather disasters, mass migration and potential 
resource wars arising from climate change pose threats to 
national security in themselves (Dyer 2005). This scenario of 
national security risk under global climate change can trans-
form the calculus of self-interest. Because climate change 
poses a threat to one’s own security and economic interests, 
enlightened self-interest can recognize the necessity of global 
cooperation as the only solution to the problem (Townsend and 
Harris 2004). In the long run, moreover, the ultimate logic of 
climate change demands the recognition of complex interde-
pendence (Vogeler and Imber 2013:6). This renders pointless 
the attempt to define security solely in national terms. In this 
way, then, even realist self-interest might prompt nations to 
work toward the mitigation of global climate change. If nations 
were operating under such assumptions, their newspapers 
would stress the global climate change negotiations where bar-
gains and burdens must be hammered out.
Institutionalist theory has many varieties. The strongest 
variety posits that actors tend to follow rules and regulations 
decided by authorities and backed by sanctions (Amenta 
2005; Brinton and Nee 1998). If the UN Kyoto institutions 
were strong, we would expect newspapers to frame climate 
change as a matter of compliance. However, to IR scholars 
working on global climate change, the problem is that the 
institutions of the international climate change regime are 
weak and ineffective (Okereke, Bulkeley, and Schroeder 
2009; Young 2002). Therefore, we would not expect a com-
pliance frame to be very prevalent. At most, it would appear 
among those nations that had accepted emissions reductions 
targets under the Kyoto Protocol and were worried about 
their attainment.
Neoinstitutional theory adds the force of “mimetic iso-
morphism” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). In this scenario, 
under conditions of uncertainty where they are not sure what 
to do, actors copy what other actors are doing. As long as we 
keep adding carbon dioxide to the atmosphere, the intensifi-
cation of climate change has high scientific certainty 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2013). But the 
exact timing, location, and type of disasters remain highly 
uncertain. This latter uncertainty, though, by distancing 
effect from cause, seems to reinforce denial of the problem 
rather than concern. When the costs of action are high, uncer-
tainty can support inertia. This theory, then, would predict 
newspaper framing against the reduction of emissions.
Social constructivism (another version of neoinstitutional 
theory) sees national interest as affected by moral and nor-
mative pressures coming from other actors (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998). More specifically, world society theory posits 
that the new norms of scientific agreement, cooperation, 
mitigation and ecologism urged by the UNFCCC and other 
agreements will shape national interests (Frank, Hironaka, 
and Schofer 2000; Hironaka 2014). If so, national newspaper 
frames should reflect a strong concern for both global nego-
tiations and for the global ecology (as a common good). UN 
membership does increase newspaper attention to climate 
change and to scientific reports from the IPCC (Broadbent 
et al. 2013). But under the cooperative ethic, newspapers in 
developing societies could readily point the finger of blame 
and responsibility at societies with long polluting records 
like the United States. Such norm diffusion approaches must 
also consider the reverse possibility—the global diffusion of 
reactionary frames denying the existence of anthropogenic 
climate change.
Along with global factors such as sketched above, a wide 
range of domestic factors may shape the framing profile of 
a case (Alasuutari and Qadir 2013, Alasuutari, Qadir, and 
Creutz 2013). For instance, a high level of vulnerability to 
climate effects could push the newspapers to focus on local 
disasters. Other potential domestic factors include the cul-
tural evaluation of science as an arbiter of truth (Jasanoff 
2005), the moral culture, the configuration of domestic 
interests in the fossil fuel economy, state capacity to shape 
energy sourcing, the inertia of domestic institutions, the cost 
and feasibility of alternative energy sources, and many oth-
ers. A range of such causal factors has been posited as 
hypotheses (Broadbent 2010). Given the complexity of cau-
sality, the pressure of mounting climate change disasters 
could still push the global field in any number of direc-
tions—either toward enhanced cooperation or toward bal-
kanization and a life-boat ethic—with huge consequences 
for the outcomes of global negotiations. In the time period 
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analyzed in this article (2007–2008) and into the present, 
societies exhibit different mixtures and configurations of the 
frames discussed above. Transparency about the configura-
tion of frames they do hold will be critical to building trust 
in the continuing negotiations.
Data and Methods
Newspapers provide an accessible medium through which to 
assess national tendencies in issue framing (Gamson 1992; 
Hallin and Mancini 2004). Newspaper frames provide a gen-
eral indicator of nationally prevalent cultural evaluations 
about an issue, albeit especially those of elites (Boykoff 
2011; Carvalho 2007). Media is a site for struggle over the 
definition of social reality (Gamson et al. 1992; Gurevitch 
and Levy 1985).
As such, frames can shed light on the types of actions that 
a society and political system is likely to take in a given issue 
area (Nisbet 2009). Given the range of factors influencing 
the actual policies of the state and the outcomes, though, the 
connection between newspaper frames and policy outcomes 
must be interpreted in context. Other factors could also affect 
a nation’s mitigation response without appearing in the 
newspapers. We return to this issue in the conclusion.
With teams collecting data in 16 countries plus Taiwan, 
the project on Comparing Climate Change Policy Networks 
(Compon) analyzed these 17 cases (Ragin and Becker 1992) 
of societal climate change framing in newspapers. Research 
teams used common data-collection instruments and proce-
dures to gather and code comparable information. Among 
the most widely read newspapers, teams selected, when pos-
sible, three with different ideological orientations: conserva-
tive, liberal, and economic (as defined in the respective 
societies). The teams searched the computerized archives of 
these newspapers for articles in 2007 and 2008 that mention 
the keywords: climate change or global warming (in their 
respective languages).
The first step consisted of finding the news share of cli-
mate change articles. The teams counted the numbers of 
articles mentioning the keyword climate change or global 
warming per year from 1997 to 2010 and divided that num-
ber by the total number of articles. Here, the results parallel 
that found by other work (Boykoff 2011).
Next, the teams focused on the key period of 2007 and 
2008, preceding the 2009 COP 15 conference. They 
extracted a database of all articles that mentioned the key-
word climate change or global warming and eliminated 
articles that mentioned the keywords only as a minor sub-
ject. Some case teams coded all of these keyword articles, 
while others took a random sample of them for coding. The 
teams coded a total of 18,721 articles about climate change 
for the 2007–2008 period.
The coding proceeded in two steps. These steps differed 
by case and by when the case entered the coding process. 
Those teams starting early coded all or a random sample of 
these articles focusing on identifying information (date, 
page, newspaper name), main issues (inductively summa-
rized by the coders), issue frames (succinct terms for the 
main issues defined by coders), scale (domestic or interna-
tional news), and source (domestic or foreign news source).
The project coordinator subsequently went through the 
inductively coded issue frames. Through induction, he 
extracted a common set of meta-frames that could cover all 
the diverse inductive frames from all the available cases. 
Over the course of three years (2012–2015), this matching 
procedure produced a set of 131 meta-frames that could be 
used in common by all the cases.
The teams that had already inductively coded their arti-
cles then recoded a subsample of those articles using this 
new, common set of meta-frames, assigning a single main 
meta-frame for each article. The teams that joined at this 
later stage started their coding using the 131-meta-frame set 
on a reduced random sample of their total number of key-
word articles. For all the cases, the purpose was to arrive at a 
representative sample of keyword articles coded using the 
131-meta-frame set.
Because the teams were working independently, follow-
ing a common protocol but loosely coordinated within the 
limits of international possibility, they ended up coding dif-
ferent numbers and percentages of articles (randomly 
selected if a subsample) out of their sample of keyword arti-
cles (Brazil, 522 of 2,996; Canada, 452 of 603; China, 447 of 
480; Germany, 190 of 191; Greece, 224 of 1,133; India, 471 
of 1,206; Ireland, 517 of 517; Japan, 243 of 2,425; Korea, 
184 of 925; Mexico, 473 of 1,810; New Zealand, 1701 of 
1,701; Portugal, 247 of 1,344; Sweden, 199 of 1,502; 
Switzerland, 549 of 549; Taiwan, 422 of 840; United 
Kingdom, 371 of 375; United States, 731 of 1,221).
For the analytical purposes of this article, the set of 131 
meta-frames has been reduced to 33 synthesized frames in 10 
categories (see Appendix Table A1). To enable comparison 
among the cases despite the differences in the number of 
articles coded in each, the statistical significance of the num-
bers was tested using a cumulative binomial distribution test 
and the results were coded to produce the matrix for netfield 
analysis (Sonnett 2016). Two benchmarks were used to 
assess whether framing categories represent at least 1 percent 
(up to 4.9 percent) or 5 percent (or more) of articles for each 
of the 17 cases. These two benchmarks captured variation 
better than other combinations that were tested, and corre-
spond to half a standard deviation below or above the aver-
age cell percentage of 3.03 percent.
A matrix of ties between frames and cases was then ana-
lyzed using social network analysis and correspondence 
analysis. Cells in the matrix for social network analysis were 
coded 2 for 5 percent, 1 for 1 percent, and 0 for nonsignifi-
cant (<1 percent), representing the presence or absence and 
strength of ties. Cells for correspondence analysis were 
coded 3 for 5 percent, 2 for 1 percent, and 1 for nonsignifi-
cant, representing strength of association within the field of 
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media discourse. This combination of methods shows both 
the pattern of ties between cases and frames and the opposi-
tions that create divisions in the field.
After mapping the dimensions of difference within this 
field, we draw on qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) 
(Ragin 2008) to examine how configurations of major frames 
relate to mitigation outcomes. The QCA approach, based on 
the logic of case studies, assumes that causal variables are 
best analyzed as combinations or configurations of condi-
tions, instead of as independent variables. We therefore 
examine how major dimensions of difference in the framing 
of climate change are combined in each case, and how these 
combinations relate to our outcome variable, success in 
attaining emissions reduction goals.
Findings
Global Field of Climate Change Discourse
Data on the comparative news share of climate change and 
global warming articles show a rising international trend of cov-
erage (Figure 1). The broad gray line traces the global average 
in each year. The collective peaks respond to important events 
in the international climate change regime: the 1997 Kyoto COP 
that produced the Kyoto Protocol, the 2001 Third Assessment 
Report by the IPCC, the 2007 IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, 
and the 2009 COP 15 in Copenhagen, when China first took a 
leading role in the international negotiations.
The rising trend of coverage, with peaks responding to 
important global events about climate change, indicate 
the gradual strengthening of a global climate change cul-
ture. The national bumps in 2003 coincide with the Third 
Assessment Report of the IPCC. The very striking 
multiple peaks in 2007 coincide with the IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report, as well as the Stern report and the 
film An Inconvenient Truth. Then global coverage reached 
a higher peak for the 2009 COP 15. During this time, 
developing countries realized that they would have to be 
included in the next formation of the global regime. So 
they began to mobilize and debate the issues internally, 
and newspapers started covering climate change issues 
more intensively.
Exploring some of the seeming anomalies in these data 
produced surprising answers. Why did Sweden, a leader in 
mitigation, have so little coverage of climate change com-
pared with many other cases much less advanced in mitiga-
tion? The Sweden team leaders explained that the issue of 
climate change is so taken from granted in Sweden that it is 
not very newsworthy. At the other extreme, why did China, 
long relatively low in climate change coverage, suddenly 
leap to the top in 2009? The leader of the China team 
explained that during the 2009 Copenhagen meeting, China 
fully joined the international negotiations for the first time. 
Its participation was big news at home and around the 
world. China was especially concerned in its news cover-
age and at the negotiations that the world would appreciate 
its already considerable investments in alternative sources 
of energy. If the cases had not been highlighted by the com-
parative trend lines, these individual qualities would not 
have been so apparent.
Figure 2 maps the framing of climate change news in a 
global media discourse field as described by the 17 cases. 
Thick lines indicate relatively strong ties to frames (≥5 per-
cent) and thin lines weaker ties (from 1 percent to 4.9 per-
cent). The first and second correspondence factors define the 
horizontal and vertical axes of the layout. The combination 
Figure 1. Articles mentioning climate change (percentage of total articles, 17 societies).
Note: Percentage articles for Canada and Greece are derived from two newspapers and for New Zealand from two papers until 2003.
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of these two factors maps important contrasts between 
opposed frames and their supporting societies. We interpret 
these contrasts along two diagonals that form an implicit X 
on the diagram.
The diagonal from upper left to lower right juxtaposes 
a focus on global climate change ecological impacts 
(Ecology-Foreign/Global) in the upper left quadrant ver-
sus a focus on domestic climate change ecological impacts 
(Ecology-Domestic) in the lower right. This diagonal also 
juxtaposes a focus on global/multinational climate change 
politics versus a focus on domestic climate change poli-
tics. In other words, this diagonal reveals two major 
sources of division in the global field that go together or 
vary in tandem, one concerned with the scope of ecologi-
cal concern and one concerned with the scope of political 
concern.
The second diagonal, running from the lower left to the 
upper right, contrasts the acceptance of consensus climate 
science (Science-Accept/Use) in the lower left versus 
debates about and opposition to the science (Science-
Debate/Oppose) in the upper right. The same diagonal con-
trasts support for mitigation policy (Mit. Policy-Pro) in the 
lower left versus debate of/opposition to mitigation policy 
(Mit. Policy-Debate/Oppose) in the upper right respec-
tively. Once again, this second diagonal reveals two major 
sources of division in the global field that vary together—
the framing of science and the support for mitigation 
policy.
A number of secondary oppositions are also apparent, and 
drawing on Bourdieu’s (1993) field theory, we might inter-
pret the horizontal axis as split between two poles. On the 
right, we see the dominance of economic capital, with frames 
for consumer behavior and climate change as economic 
threat on the upper right and economic impacts and green 
economic growth on the bottom right. On the left we see 
frames associated with cultural capital, seen especially in the 
acceptance and use of climate science on the lower left but 
also in the legitimacy given to international political institu-
tions on the upper left. The vertical axis can be interpreted as 
the overall volume of capital, with cases at the top represent-
ing a “field of power” defined by high amounts of either eco-
nomic or cultural capital, and the cases at the bottom having 
lower amounts of these types of capital. These dimensions of 
the global field are worthy of further research, but in the fol-
lowing sections, we focus on the four dimensions of media 
framing explicated above.
Figure 2. Global field of media discourse about climate change.
Note: CC = climate change; Econ. = economy; Mit. = mitigation; Resp. = responsibility; Soc. = society; UN = United Nations.
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Four Contrasts in Climate Change Framing
Figure 3 provides more detail on contrasts between cases in 
the framing of the four contentious issues revealed above: 
science, ecology, politics, and mitigation policy. In each 
panel of Figure 3, the cases are arranged to highlight the 
major differences along the variable (as indicated by bar 
height). The vertical axis represents the percentage of all cli-
mate change newspaper articles that use this climate change 
frame.
As discussed above, acceptance of the consensus climate 
change science is a sine qua non of purposeful mitigation 
action. Figure 3a makes clear that a majority of societies 
strongly accept consensus science, especially in Europe and 
Asia. Debate and opposition comes from a culturally defined 
cluster of Anglo societies—first and foremost the United 
States, but also Canada, the United Kingdom, and New 
Zealand (Dunlap and McCright 2015; Painter 2013; Stern 
2016). U.S. discourse is highly influenced by conservative 
think tanks financed by the fossil fuel industry to produce 
doubt about climate science, and this influence has spread to 
other English-speaking societies (Dunlap and McCright 
2010; Dunlap and Jacques 2013; Farrell 2016). This cluster-
ing may also indicate a common cultural preference for lais-
sez-faire market systems and rejection of state policy 
interventions (Dobbin 1994).
Breaking apart the debating/rejecting science frame into 
its two components—debate versus reject—shows that sci-
ence debate dominated the New Zealand press, while science 
rejection dominated the other three Anglo countries. In 2008, 
New Zealand passed the world’s first combined industrial 
and agricultural cap-and-trade policy and was continuing to 
debate its necessity and effects. The United Kingdom passed 
a “world-leading” climate and emissions reductions bill 
despite controversy (Giddens 2009). In Canada, one major 
paper largely accepted the consensus science position, while 
another provided more space for climate skepticism 
(Stoddart, Haluza-DeLay, and Tindall 2016). These contra-
dictory tendencies soften the rejection of science evident in 
the Anglo cluster, making the United States exceptional in its 
degree of rejection.
Within this rejection-tending Anglo cluster, we find an 
intriguing anomaly—Sweden, the country that founded cli-
mate change science. According to the Swedish team, nor-
mally, the Swedish press presents no objections to the 
mainstream climate science. The paucity of science related 
articles indicate the taken-for-granted quality of the science. 
Indeed, in 1896 a Swedish chemist, Svante Arrhenius, dis-
covered the chemical basis of carbon dioxide accumulation 
in the atmosphere from human activities and predicted the 
greenhouse effect. And in 1988, a Swedish climatologist, 
Bert Bolin, founded the IPCC (Bolin 2007). But during the 
period of our focus, some letters to the editor and opinion 
articles had expressed the rejectionist position (Anshelm 
and Hultman 2014).
Once accepting the scientific consensus, it becomes 
more imperative to assess the ecological risk from climate 
change. Societies differ in the locus and magnitude of their 
ecological concern (Figure 3b). Locus varies from Foreign/
Global Ecology to Domestic Ecology. On the left end, 
Figure 3. Opposed frames in the global field of media discourse: relative acceptance or debating/opposition to consensus climate 
change science (a); global/foreign versus domestic scale of climate ecological impacts (b); orientation to multinational, global, or domestic 
climate change politics (c); and relative support for versus debate/opposition to governmental mitigation policies for the reduction of 
carbon emissions (d).
Note: UN = United Nations.
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Germany, Sweden and China show strong concern about 
global ecology. On the right, Mexico and India are highly 
concerned about domestic risks. Taiwan, Ireland, the United 
Kingdom, and South Korea also show high levels of con-
cern with domestic ecological risk. Frequent focus on 
global ecology suggests that such societies tend toward a 
universal ethic that encourages protection of the global 
commons rather than a narrow domestic focus (Dietz et al. 
2002). At the same time, the high risk and vulnerability of 
developing countries (Yohe et al. 2006) helps explain their 
domestic focus.
Important also is the magnitude of ecological focus. 
Magnitude rises at both ends of the scale, and dips in the 
center. The United States exhibits the lowest levels of eco-
logical focus, consonant with the prevalence of climate 
and science skepticism and low levels of perception of 
risk from climate change (Leiserowitz et al. 2015). At the 
right pole, Mexico and India devote 20 percent to 30 per-
cent of their climate change news coverage to concern 
about domestic ecological effects. These concerns are 
quite understandable. India and Mexico, two large devel-
oping societies near the equator, will be hit hard by the 
effects of climate change. They have populations living at 
minimal subsistence levels in the agricultural sector. 
These populations are highly sensitive to changes in 
weather patterns. If faced with severe deprivation, they 
could generate massive political demands and climate 
migrations. Brazil is in a similar situation, but lacks 
heightened ecological concern.
China is also vulnerable to climate impacts, but its party-
controlled press avoids mention of domestic problems so as 
not to stir up protest. Instead, the press focuses on China’s 
place in the world. In all four developing societies, the press 
conveys the frame of being victimized; they hold the rich 
countries responsible for emissions mitigation (see the bot-
tom of Figure 2). Accordingly, Mexico and India feel little 
responsibility to take notice of ecological effects beyond 
their borders. But the Chinese press follows the Party line, 
which at this time, in preparation for China’s inclusion in the 
2009 Copenhagen COP 15 agreement, stressed the interna-
tional dimensions of ecological problems.
Germany and Sweden contrast greatly with the develop-
ing societies. These two wealthy, industrialized societies 
have played key roles in the growth of the global climate 
regime. In both countries, a strong public sense of global 
concern and responsibility plus conducive political institu-
tions drove their exemplary environmental performance. As 
mentioned above, Sweden produced both the foundations of 
climate change science and the institutions for its global dif-
fusion (Bolin 2007). Sweden has also tapped its large hydro-
power potentials, which have helped in its rapid reduction of 
carbon emissions.
Germany, on the other hand, has traditionally relied heav-
ily on coal for its energy. And unlike France, Germany’s 
active environmental movement and Green Party have halted 
the nuclear power agenda. Germany has accomplished an 
unprecedented and ongoing energy transition (Energiewende), 
already reaching 30 percent of total electricity production 
from renewable sources and aiming for 60 percent by 2050. 
This has been based on strong public support (94 percent) 
and engagement (German Renewable Energies Agency 
2015; Giddens 2009).
After attitude toward science and degree of ecological 
concern, attention to climate politics defines a third dimen-
sion of societal response. Both the scale and the magnitude 
of coverage of climate change politics varies greatly. In the 
case of climate change, the major source of norms of action 
come from global sources such as the UN. But Figure 3c 
indicates that a predominant orientation to UN climate 
change politics is only found in Japan and Greece. China and 
Portugal also devote a large share of their news coverage to 
global and UN politics.
Other countries do devote a large share of their news to 
the politics of climate change, but on either a domestic or 
multinational scale. For member countries of the European 
Union (EU), attention to multinational news indicates atten-
tion to EU politics, which mandates much of their climate 
policy. Under the EU bubble for the Kyoto Protocol, the 
whole EU (15 members in 1997) agreed to reduce total emis-
sions by 8 percent from 1990 levels (United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 2015b). Within 
the EU, a North-South divide resulted in Germany’s large 
economy assuming responsibility for extensive reductions, 
while Portugal, Greece, and Ireland increased emissions 
from their small economies.
If we compare domestic versus all non-EU multina-
tional and global framing, China plus three EU coun-
tries—Portugal, Switzerland, and Germany—reveal very 
strong outward-looking political orientations. At the other 
extreme, the United States, Canada, and Mexico are the 
most inward looking, forming a North American bloc 
where national politics and interests are privileged over 
international (or cosmopolitan) ways of framing the issue. 
India also focuses more on domestic climate change poli-
tics, although its total political focus is relatively low. 
Taiwan’s concern with domestic effects is a special case 
because, as a society and not a nation, it is not a member 
of the UN. Research has shown that Taiwan’s newspapers 
respond relatively weakly to UN events and the global 
norms they propagate (Broadbent et al. 2013).
Finally, the most practical of the four framing orienta-
tions is to make policies to reduce emissions. There are 
many ways to take action, some stressing voluntary public 
and business activity such as conservation. However, the 
most effective programs require proactive government 
policies to impose common rules and sanctions. Such gov-
ernment policies include regulated standards, carbon taxes, 
cap and trade, subsidies for alternative energy, reductions 
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targets and transportation regulations. Our data summarize 
the frames for all the distinct types of government mitiga-
tion policies.
Cases cluster into three clear groups: pro, balanced, and 
debate/oppose proactive government mitigation policy 
(see Figure 3d). In decreasing order of magnitude, India, 
Sweden, Japan, China, Brazil, Greece, Switzerland, and 
Portugal belong to the pro group. Korea, Ireland, Germany, 
Canada, the United Kingdom, and Mexico display a rela-
tive balance between pro and con. The United States, New 
Zealand, and Taiwan display high levels of opposition to 
government mitigation policies. This pattern in the fram-
ing of mitigation policy partially overlaps with patterns in 
the previous three stages of societal response, but also 
shows divergence.
Newspaper Framing and Mitigation Outcomes
On the basis of the arguments advanced above, we posit 
the following hypothesis: compared with the 1990 base-
line, countries are more likely to reduce emissions when 
their newspaper frames accept IPCC-type science, orient 
to the global level of climate politics and ecological risks, 
and support mitigation policies. Table 1 presents scores for 
each case on four sets of frames and on four emissions-
related outcome measures. Each framing set is constructed 
out of two opposite values of the frames illustrated in 
Figures 3a to 3d, defined as the score on the positive pole 
minus the score on the negative pole: Accepting Science 
(minus Debating/Oppose Science), Global Impacts (minus 
Domestic Impacts), Global/UN Politics (minus Domestic 
Politics), and Mitigation Policy-Pro (minus Mitigation 
Policy-Debate/Con). So, for example, Brazil gives strong 
attention (>5 percent) to Accepting Science but also weak 
attention (>1 percent) to Debate/Oppose Science, so we 
code Brazil as having weakly positive membership in 
Accepting Science.
We summarize this fuzzy-set approach in Table 1 in the 
style of Ragin and Fiss (2008:205). Two plus signs (++) 
indicate strong set membership, and one plus sign (+) indi-
cates weaker membership; no sign indicates a balance, 
with both sides having the same value; one minus sign (–) 
indicates weak negative membership, and two minus signs 
(– –) indicate strong negative membership. Positive mem-
bership in all four sets describes the configuration we 
hypothesize to be most conducive to emissions reductions: 
accepting climate science, recognizing global climate 
impacts, engaging with global and UN politics, and sup-
porting mitigation policies.
The four outcome variables are the assigned reduction 
target under the Kyoto Protocol (or as modified by the EU 
bubble), with non–Annex I cases marked as “NA”; the 
actual percentage change in carbon dioxide emissions 
from 1990 to an average of 2008–2012 (the first Kyoto 
commitment period) (Olivier et al. 2015); the difference 
from the Kyoto/EU target for Annex I countries (a nega-
tive percentage means reducing emissions more than the 
target, a positive percentage means reducing emissions 
Table 1. Clusters of Cases, Framing Sets, and Emissions Outcomes.
Cluster Case
Accepting 
Science
Global 
Impacts
Global/UN 
Politics
Mitigation 
Policy-Pro
Kyoto/EU 
Target
% Change 1990 
to 2008–2012
Difference 
from Target
Attainment 
with Credits
Global 
ecopolitics
China + + ++ NA 278.2% NA NA
Switzerland ++ + + + –8.0% –2.2% 5.8% –8.7%
Germany + + –21.0%a –21.2% –0.2% –24.7%
Japan + + –6.0% 7.2% 13.2% –8.4%
Korea + + NA 116.0% NA NA
European 
ecopolitics
Portugal ++ + + 27.0%a 26.4% –0.6% 12.3%
Greece ++ + + 25.0%a 17.1% –7.9% 16.7%
Sweden ++ 4.0%a –15.5% –19.5% –15.9%
Ireland + – – 13.0%a 26.4% 13.4% 11.3%
Domestic 
ecopolitics
Brazil + + NA 92.7% NA NA
India + – – ++ NA 180.5% NA NA
Mexico + – – – NA 56.6% NA NA
Taiwan + – – – – – NA 114.5% NA NA
Anglo 
ecopolitics
Canada – – – –6.0% 22.8% 28.8% NA
United Kingdom – – –12.5%a –16.3% –3.8% –22.5%
New Zealand – + – – 0.0% 44.5% 44.5% –20.3%
United States – – – – –7.0% 7.9% 14.9% NA
Note: EU = European Union; NA = non–Annex I; UN = United Nations; ++ = strongly in the set; + = weakly in the set; – = weakly out of the set; – – = 
strongly out of the set.
aMember of the EU.
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less than the target); and the percentage change in carbon 
dioxide emissions when land use, land-use change, and 
forestry (LULUCF) activities and Kyoto credits are 
applied (Greenhouse Gas Inventory Office of Japan 2014) 
The cases in Table 1 are arranged according to their place-
ments in Figure 2, beginning at the upper left and moving 
counterclockwise. They are grouped into four clusters on 
the basis of similarities with neighboring cases.
The Global Ecopolitics cluster (Figure 2, top left) 
contains the largest number of positive set memberships 
in total. All its members accept science, and four support 
mitigation policy. The only case with membership in all 
four sets is Switzerland. China and Germany share the 
first two conditions, highlighting the fundamental impor-
tance of recognizing and researching climate problems, 
while Japan and Korea share acceptance of science and 
support for mitigation policy. In this cluster, only 
Germany attained its Kyoto target through domestic 
emissions reductions, all the more unusual because its 
target demanded so much. However, by counting 
LULUCF activities and Kyoto credits (for sponsoring 
green projects in developing countries under the Clean 
Development Mechanism or Joint Implementation proj-
ects), both Switzerland and Japan attained their Kyoto 
targets. China and Korea were not Annex I countries and 
so did not have Kyoto targets, and both increased their 
emissions greatly.
In the European ecopolitics cluster (Figure 2, center 
left and right), Portugal and Greece share three of the four 
conditions, giving strong attention to science, global and 
UN politics, and supporting mitigation policy. Sweden has 
only one positive condition—strong membership in the 
pro–mitigation policy set. As explained above, Sweden’s 
weak negative membership in the science set was an 
exception. Ireland has a weak positive on science, but 
weak negatives on the two global sets. In this Euro Policy 
cluster, both Portugal and Greece attained their relaxed 
Kyoto targets (under the EU bubble) through domestic 
emissions reductions, while Sweden dramatically reduced 
its emissions far below its Kyoto/EU target. Ireland 
increased its emissions far above its relaxed Kyoto/EU 
target but attained its target when LULUCF activities and 
Kyoto credits are considered.
The domestic ecopolitics cluster (Figure 2, bottom 
left and right) is composed of four non–Annex I cases 
that did not receive Kyoto targets. All four exhibit weak 
positive membership in the science set. India, Mexico, 
and Taiwan are strongly negative on global impacts, 
meaning that they focus very much upon the domestic 
ecological effects of climate change, while Brazil is an 
anomaly in this cluster for its balanced attention to global 
and domestic scales. Taiwan is strongly negative on the 
global and UN politics set, attributable to its not being a 
member of the UN. India is a strong positive member of 
the pro–mitigation policy set, while Brazil is a weak pos-
itive member of the same.
Finally, the Anglo ecopolitics cluster (Figure 2, top 
right), in contrast to the global ecopolitics cluster, con-
tains the largest number of weak negatives, with the 
exception of one weak positive. Two cases in this cluster 
are balanced on mitigation policy (Canada, the United 
Kingdom), while two are negative (New Zealand, the 
United States). The United States and Canada, both of 
which subsequently rejected the Kyoto treaty, both had 
large emissions rises. New Zealand also had a large rise in 
emissions but attained its Kyoto target through LULUCF 
activities and Kyoto credits. The United Kingdom reduced 
its emissions below its Kyoto target and lowered them fur-
ther through LULUCF activities and Kyoto credits.
Conclusion
This project identified four key contentious dimensions in 
the global field of climate change discourse over the fol-
lowing frames: validity of climate science, scale of eco-
logical risk, scale of climate politics, and support for 
mitigation policy. These four dimensions produce four 
main clusters of cases. The findings presented in Table 1 
provide modest confirmation for our hypothesis: com-
pared with the 1990 baseline, countries are more likely to 
reduce emissions when their newspaper frames accept 
IPCC-type science, orient to the global level of climate 
politics and ecological risks, and support mitigation poli-
cies. This hypothesis does not indicate an arrow of causal-
ity from newspaper frames to policy outcomes but only a 
modest association between the two. States that are more 
successful in reducing emissions might issue proclama-
tions of meeting international targets, thus reversing the 
causality. However, at least in societies that enjoy consid-
erable media freedom, the detailed coding of 131 types of 
newspaper frames carried out in this article provides a 
wider indication of the general media culture beyond nar-
row state purposes.
The results show the complexity of set configurations 
and the importance of contextual case-level interpretation. 
However, the overall pattern indicates general support for 
the hypothesis. All Annex I cases in the global and 
European ecopolitics clusters met their assigned Kyoto tar-
gets, whether through domestic reductions or Kyoto cred-
its, while only some of the Anglo cases met their targets. 
The domestic ecopolitics cluster, as non–Annex I cases, 
mostly paid strong attention to the domestic effects of cli-
mate change while rapidly increasing emissions. As the 
data show, they tend to agree that the developed countries 
should accept a heavier burden for solving the climate 
change problem (what has been called “equity in responsi-
bility”) and insist on their own right to fossil fuel–powered 
economic growth.
Broadbent et al. 13
Some specifics of the cases run counter to the general 
pattern. Strong inclusion in the pro–mitigation policy set 
corresponds to decreased emissions (Sweden) or rapidly 
increasing emissions (India and China). Two cases with 
balanced discourse on climate policy have decreased 
emissions (Germany, the United Kingdom), while others 
have increased emissions (Mexico, Ireland, Canada). 
Cases voicing support for both science and mitigation 
policy have a range of emissions increases from small 
(Switzerland, Japan) to medium (Portugal, Greece) to 
large (Korea, Brazil). Media discourse tipped toward 
debate and opposition to mitigation policy is related to 
increased emissions, but these range from small (United 
States) to medium (New Zealand) to large (Taiwan). Also, 
some cases met their targets only through the Kyoto credit 
mechanisms (Switzerland, Japan, Ireland, New Zealand). 
These variations may be due to additional political, eco-
nomic, or cultural characteristics that will be explored in 
future studies.
Overall, the findings provide evidence for both realist 
national interest theory and world society global norm dif-
fusionist theory, but show more variation than encom-
passed by those theories. Among the Kyoto protocol 
Annex I cases, those that were positive or balanced on the 
global and UN politics set reduced their emissions more 
than those that had a negative relation to this set. Media 
framing is a key component of the cultural politics of cli-
mate change that may reinforce policy orientations and 
mitigation performance. When it is more inclusive of an 
international or cosmopolitan perspective, supports scien-
tific consensus and gives visibility to promitigation 
frames, media framing can indicate the existence of a pos-
itive cultural reinforcement for shifts toward ecological 
sustainability. Inversely, media framing that is inward 
looking or gives high visibility to skeptics reinforces cul-
tural barriers to successful climate action.
The analysis indicates a global field where, as pre-
dicted by world society theory, cosmopolitan attention to 
global (UN) climate change politics is associated with 
factors productive of national climate change mitigation 
efforts. But it also reveals, as predicted by realist theory, 
the existence of a more inward focus in some cases that is 
associated with science denialism or externalizing the 
blame. This has deep implications for the possibilities of 
a more cosmopolitan climate politics. In our data, climate 
cosmopolitanism appears to be more of a European phe-
nomenon, although the Anglo-American bloc really does 
not fit this model. At the same time, the field that we map 
really does not seem to align well with the major world 
systems theory divide between overdeveloped countries 
and less developed countries. As such, our results provide 
insight into the dimensions that do structure the interna-
tional field of climate change policy and public debate. 
They point out that although some regions of the world 
are embracing a more cosmopolitan framework for inter-
preting climate change and its politics, there are other key 
parts of the world where there appear to be significant 
social-cultural barriers to a more cosmopolitan approach 
to the issue. Climate change disasters themselves can 
lead to other social problems such as civil wars, arguably 
the case for Syria, that pose great barriers to cosmopoli-
tan orientations. It is questionable whether climate-
induced catastrophe will be emancipatory, leading toward 
increased awareness of interdependency in forging solu-
tions, or will enhance reactionary and self-protective 
nationalism that will work against such solutions.
Along with media framing analysis, the Compon proj-
ect is carrying out policy network studies of the climate 
change political process in diverse societies. The policy 
network approach provides direct insight into the forma-
tion of advocacy coalitions and the role of the state and 
other political actors in shaping policy outcomes. Further 
studies under the Compon project will seek to specify the 
interactions between actual policy processes, media repre-
sentations, and policy outcomes that cause emissions tra-
jectories. Viewing this article as a demonstration of 
concept, future detailed content analysis through auto-
mated media text mining will enable ongoing study of 
global media discourse as it responds to changing climate 
effects. Insight into the varied ways in which different 
societies interpret the common problem of global climate 
change can support international negotiations and policy 
formation by illuminating where either barriers or com-
mon ground are more likely to be found.
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